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1.

INTRODUCTION

Traditionally, trademark and unfair competition laws have protected
trademark owners against unauthorized uses of their marks that are likely to
confuse or mislead consumers about the origin of goods or services. If a
particular use is not likely to confuse or mislead, then it is not actionable under
traditional infringement regimes. When applied to commercial speech, as
opposed to noncommercial expression, traditional trademark and unfair
competition laws generally have survived scrutiny under the First Amendment,
because these laws restrict only commercial speech that is false or misleading.1
Dilution laws, however, do not restrict speech that is false or misleading.
Dilution laws were enacted to address a perceived gap in trademark law by

* William S. Boyd Professor of Law. William S. Boyd School of Law. University of Nevada. Las
Vegas.
1. See, e.g., Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1022 (9th Cir. 1985)
(citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council. Inc., 425 U.S. 748,771-73 (1976)
(finding an injunction prohibiting the use of a company designation that would likely confuse the public
not violative of First Amendment rights); cf Cent. Hudson Gas & Elect. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n.
447 U.S. 557, 563 64 (1980) (noting that laws restricting deceptive commercial speech do not violate
the First Amendment).
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enabling the owner of a famous trademark2 to prevent the unauthorized use of its
mark even if that use is neither misleading nor confusing.3 Instead, dilution laws
protect the owners of famous trademarks against two types of harm that arise
even in the absence of consumer confusion.
Dilution of the "blurring" variety applies to unauthorized uses which are
thought to somehow undermine the ability of a mark to identify and distinguish
the goods or services of the mark's owner.4 Typically, a blurring claim involves
a defendant that applies another merchant's famous trademark to products which
are so unrelated to those of the trademark owner that consumers are unlikely to
be confused about the origin of the goods. This has been described as a freerider problem. 5 The owner of a famous mark is viewed as deserving this type of
protection by virtue of having made a significant investment in building the
fame of the mark, an investment which will lose some portion of its value if
another merchant is allowed to use a similar mark, even in a nonconfusing way.
The owner of the famous mark can therefore invoke dilution laws to prevent
others from basking in its reflective glow for example, by selling Rolex
toasters or Mercedes ice cream. For example, the Ringling Bros.-Barnum &
Bailey circus asserted dilution of the blurring variety against the state of Utah
for advertising "The Greatest Snow on Earth." 6
Dilution of the "tarnishlment" variety applies to unauthorized uses which are
thought to reflect negatively on the mark and damage its reputation. This
negative effect could occur because the mark is used on goods of inferior quality
or on goods which have negative associations, such as pornographic
merchandise or other merchandise which may be considered to be in poor taste.
For example, the owner of the Victoria's Secret trademark used the tarnishment
theory to sue the operator of a small town adult novelty store who initially
named his store "Victor's Secret," and then, in a futile effort to avoid the

2. Most state dilution laws, like the federal statute, protect only marks of particularly high renown,
although this requirement is not universal. See Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No.
109-312, § 2, 120 Stat. 1730, 1731 (to be codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 1125(c)); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 6447.107 (2007) (protecting any distinctive mark); Wedgwood Homes, Inc. V. Lund, 659 P.2d 377
(Or.1983) (applying Oregon statute).
3. See Frank 1. Schechter, The RationalBasis of TrademarkProtection,40 HARV. L. REV. 813,
830 33 (1927).
4. See Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 § 2.
5. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
6. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d
449, 451 (4th Cir. 1999). Although the plaintiff lost its federal dilution claim because it failed to prove
actual harm to the selling power of its mark, id.
at 463, the federal statute has since been amended to
eliminate this requirement, requiring instead that plaintiffs prove only a likelihood that its mark will be
harmed (which was already the prevailing standard under state dilution statutes). See id. at 454; 15
U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1). Under this new standard, the Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey plaintiff would
almost certainly have prevailed.
7. Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 § 2.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol58/iss4/4

2

LaFrance: No Reason to Live: Dilution Laws as Unconstitutional Restrictions

2007]

DILUTION LAWS RESTRICTING COMMERCIAL SPEECH

lawsuit, changed it to "Victor's Little Secret." 8 Like blurring claims, tarnishment
claims do not require a trademark owner to establish that consumers are likely to
be confused or misled about the origin of the goods or services bearing the
unauthorized mark.9
Thus, dilution laws address two entirely different, and arguably unrelated,
types of alleged harms, which are typically shoehorned into a single statute.
Most state dilution statutes, as well as the recently amended federal dilution
statute, allow the owner of a famous trademark to enjoin unauthorized uses of
the mark (or very similar marks) which are likely to cause dilution of its mark by
either blurring or tarnishment. Yet the harm alleged to be caused by blurring and
tarnishment is ill-defined and, thus far, unproven. Furthermore, if any harm does
flow from dilutive activities, it may affect trademark owners in ways that do not
affect any broader public interest; indeed, dilutive activities may actually offer
some benefits to the public. In addition, by requiring trademark owners to show
only a likelihood of dilution, rather than actual harm from dilution, the dilution
statutes permit trademark owners to enjoin the commercial speech of other
merchants based on assertions of harm that are purely speculative.
For these reasons, the federal dilution statute, as well as most state dilution
statutes, are unconstitutional restrictions on commercial speech. Under the
standards established by the Supreme Court in Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York,1" dilution laws violate the
First Amendment because they restrict commercial speech without advancing
any substantial government interest."
11. No REASON

TO LIVE?

Much has been written about the constitutional problems of applying
dilution laws to noncommercial speech, 2 and these are certainly serious
problems. The federal dilution statute contains exceptions for noncommercial
uses 13 which generally have been effective in preventing courts from imposing
federal dilution liability against literary, musical, artistic, and dramatic works

8. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 422 24 (2003). In Moseley, the plaintiff
lost its federal dilution claim because it failed to establish actual harm to its trademark, id. at 434.
although it almost certainly would have prevailed under the "likelihood of dilution" standard employed
by state dilution statutes. The Moseley decision prompted Congress to amend the federal dilution statute
by eliminating the requirement of actual dilution and replacing it with the likelihood standard. See
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 § 2.
9. See Schechter, supra note 3, at 830-33.
10. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
11.See id.
at 562 66.
12. See, e.g.. Mary LaFrance. Steam Shovels and Lipstick: Trademarks, Greed, and the Public
Domain, 6 NEV. L.J. 447, 470-81 (2006) (arguing that many courts give insufficient weight to First
Amendment concerns in dilution cases involving traditional forms of expression).
13. Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, § 2, 120 Stat. 1730, 1731 (to
be codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 1125(c)(3)(C)).
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that reference famous trademarks.14 Unfortunately, most state dilution laws do
not have an express exception for noncommercial uses, and as a result
expressive works have unconstitutionally been subjected to liability under state
dilution laws
by courts that have been woefully insensitive to First Amendment
5
concerns.
Furthermore, the line between commercial and noncommercial speech is a
shaky one, and some have argued that no such distinction can or should be
drawn. 6 If there is a line, it certainly is elusive. Novelty items, such as T-shirts,
posters, and coffee mugs, frequently are purchased not for their utility but for the
messages they express. Yet courts frequently do not accord these items the same
level of constitutional protection that they give to more traditional forms of
expression. An unlicensed T-shirt bearing the trademark-protected name of a
football team or a musical group will typically be treated as infringing or
dilutive, even though the consumer purchasing the shirt typically does not view
the presence of the name on the shirt as a trademark at all, but simply as a way
to express the wearer's enthusiasm for the team or the musical group. The
impact on free expression is even more problematic when the T-shirt expresses a
criticism or commentary on the mark-for example, the word "Starsucks"
accompanied by something resembling the Starbucks logo. In the absence of a
clear and rational distinction between expressive commodities and purely
commercial commodities, dilution laws (and even some applications of
traditional trademark and unfair competition laws) will continue
to chill these
17
nontraditional, yet highly effective, forms of communication.
Moreover, even pure advertisements can be entertaining and informative,
and sometimes they challenge our sensibilities and spark debate. At times, to the
disappointment of the advertisers, advertisements do a better job of engaging
viewers in these ways than of persuading them to purchase the advertised goods
and services.
Traditional commercials also seem to be an endangered species as new
technology enables viewers to skip over commercials, leading advertisers to rely
increasingly on product placements and other techniques for seamlessly
interweaving advertising with entertainment programs. American Idol and the
ubiquitous home improvement shows epitomize this trend. In this environment,
the distinction between commercial advertising and expressive speech will be
difficult to maintain.
This Essay, however, focuses on commercial speech of the most mundane
variety ordinary commercial advertising and the labeling of goods and
services. If dilution laws are constitutionally justifiable at all, it must be because

14. LaFrance, supra note 12, at 470-80.
15. Id.
16. See, e.g.. Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?. 76 VA. L.
REV. 627 (1990) (explaining the justifications, or lack thereof, underlying the distinction between
commercial and noncommercial speech).
17. LaFrance, supra note 12. at 481-88.
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they are appropriate restrictions on commercial speech of this least protected
variety; dilution laws are clearly inappropriate restrictions on noncommercial
speech, as well as speech that straddles the uncertain border between
commercial and noncommercial. 8
With apologies to Randy Newman, I want to suggest that, from a First
Amendment perspective, dilution laws "got no reason to live."1 Their very
reason for existence-restricting commercial speech for the sole benefit of a
subset of trademark owners is not a sufficiently weighty reason to justify
government intervention in the marketplace. This differentiates dilution laws
from traditional infringement laws, which protect consumers from being
defrauded, confused, or misled.
In Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc.,2" the Ninth Circuit refused to allow
Mattel to invoke the federal dilution statute, on tarnishlment and dilution
grounds, to enjoin distribution of a song about Barbie and Ken.2 Judge Kozinski
based this decision on the fact that the song was noncommercial speech.22 In
dicta, however, he raised the question whether enjoining even commercial
speech on dilution grounds might violate the First Amendment:
Our interpretation of the noncommercial use exemption does
not eliminate all tension between the FTDA and the First
Amendment because the exemption does not apply to
commercial speech, which enjoys "qualified but nonetheless
substantial protection." It is entirely possible that a dilution
injunction against purely commercial speech would run afoul of
the First Amendment. Because
that question is not presented
23
here, we do not address it.
This Essay considers the question raised by Judge Kozinski and asks
whether issuing injunctions against commercial speech based on a mere
likelihood of dilution runs afoul of the First Amendment. If the answer is yes,
then dilution laws are unconstitutional on their face, and not merely when
applied to noncommercial speech.
First Amendment considerations are especially important in dilution cases
because injunctive relief is the standard remedy for dilution. Indeed, many state

18. See id.
19. RANDY NEWMAN, Short People, on LITTLE CRIMINALS (Warner Bros. Records Inc. 1977).
Note: The author is of average height and respects persons of all statures.
20. 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002).
21. Id. at 898-99. 906-07.
22. Id.at 906 07.
23. Id.at 905 n.7 (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60,68 (1983)) (citations
omitted).
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dilution laws do not contemplate damages as a possible remedy.24 Because
dilution claims are based on a mere likelihood of dilution, plaintiffs may bring
suit quickly enough that there is no occasion for a monetary remedy or an
insufficient basis for calculating one. When a plaintiff succeeds in proving a
likelihood of dilution, a prior restraint is imposed on the defendant based purely
on the possibility that the plaintiff may suffer some ill-defined harm to its
private commercial interests, with no consideration given to the best interests of
the public.
A.

Level of Scrutiny

It is well settled that the enforcement of trademark laws, like that of
defamation, privacy, and right of publicity laws, involves sufficient state action
to implicate the First Amendment.2 5 While the government generally must show
a "compelling" interest to justify a restriction on truthful noncommercial
speech," only a "substantial" interest is required to justify a restraint on truthful
commercial speech.27 Despite the less rigorous scrutiny applied to commercial
speech restrictions, it is doubtful whether dilution laws can pass muster, because
they are not supported by any substantial government interest. In fact, while
enforcement of dilution laws may benefit individual trademark owners, they
may actually have a negative effect on the public interest.
The Supreme Court has made clear that "the First Amendment protect[s] the
dissemination of truthful and nonmisleading commercial messages about lawful
products and services" 28 in order "to ensure that advertising provides consumers
with accurate information about the availability of goods and services." 2 9 In

24. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. BuS. LAW § 360-I (McKinney Supp. 2007) (providing only for injunctive
relief). In contrast, the federal statute permits such awards in cases of willful dilution. Trademark
Dilution Revision Act of 2006 § 2. Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730, 1731 (to be codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. 1125(c)(5)). In practice, the federal willfulness standard may be relatively easy
to satisfy. Damages may be awarded in blurring cases if the defendant "willfully intended to trade on
the recognition of the famous mark," and in tarnishment cases if the defendant "willfully intended to
harm the reputation of the famous mark." Id. § 2. The willfulness standard for blurring cases will
arguably be satisfied any time a defendant uses the famous mark, other than by sheer accident. The
willfulness standard for tarnishment cases is less clear but could apply even to humorous and parodic
uses of a mark. In both blurring and tarnishment cases, the language of the federal statute implies that
damages could be awarded even if no actual blurring or tamishment has been proven. It seems unlikely
that Congress intended this result.
25. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 574 75 (1977) (right of
publicity); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387 88 (1967) (privacy); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254. 265-66 (1964) (defamation): L.L. Bean. Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 27, 30
n.2 (1st Cir. 1987) (trademark).
26. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 256 (1986) (citing
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
27. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-65 (1980).
28. 44 Liquormart. Inc. v. Rhode Island. 517 U.S. 484, 496 (1996) (Stevens, J., plurality).
29. Id. at 496. In Virginia State Board ofPharmacy v. Virginia Citizens ConsumerCouncil, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976), the Court observed,
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem. is
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contrast, commercial advertising may be restricted where necessary to prevent
deception or to prohibit aggressive sales practices which may exert undue
influence over consumers.3 ' However, the unauthorized but nonconfusing uses
of trademarks that give rise to dilution claims typically do not fall into the latter
categories. Thus, the consumer-protection principle does not support restrictions
on commercial speech that is merely dilutive.
Under the Supreme Court's current approach, commercial speech
regulations withstand First Amendment scrutiny only if they survive the fourpart test articulated in Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission.3 First, the First Amendment protects commercial speech if it
concerns lawful activity and is not misleading. 2 Second, if the commercial
speech is protected, then the speech regulation must advance a substantial
governmental interest.3 3 Third, the regulation must directly advance the
governmental interest asserted.34 Fourth, the restriction on speech must not be
3 5
more extensive than is necessary to serve the asserted government interest.
Although the Court has not applied a "least restrictive means" standard, it does
require a reasonable ""'fit" between the legislature's ends and the means chosen
to accomplish those ends,' . . . a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired
objective. 37 The Court requires "the government goal to be substantial, and the

nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling what
product. for what reason, and at what price. So long as we preserve a
predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources in large
measure will be made through numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter
of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well
informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable.
Id. at 765.
30. Id. at 498 (quoting Va. State Bd of Pharmacy,425 U.S. at 772 n.24).
31.
32.
33.
34.

447 U.S. at 562 66.
Id. at 564.
Id.
Id. The Supreme Court further stated,
The third part of the Central Hudson test asks whether the speech restriction
directly and materially advanc[es] the asserted governmental interest. "This
burden is not satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture: rather, a governmental
body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate that
the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a
material degree."
Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173. 188 (1999) (quoting Edenfield v.
Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 71 (1993)). In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001), however,
the Court noted,
We do not, however, require that "empirical data come ... accompanied by a
surfeit of background information. ... [W]e have permitted litigants to justify
speech restrictions by reference to studies and anecdotes pertaining to different
locales altogether, or even, in a case applying strict scrutiny, to justify restrictions
based solely on history. consensus, and 'simple common sense."'
Id. at 555 (quoting Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc.. 515 U.S. 618, 628 (1995)).
35. Board of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 479 80 (1989).
36. Id. at 480; Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 556 (citing Went ForIt, 515 U.S. at 632).
37. Went ForIt. 515 U.S. at 632 (quoting Fox, 492 U.S. at 480).
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cost to be carefully calculated."38 Accordingly, "the State bears the burden of
justifying its restrictions" on commercial speech by "affirmatively establish[ing]
the reasonable fit" required between the restrictions imposed and the substantial
interest that is claimed.39
Dilution laws fail the CentralHudson test. First, the types of speech that are
actionable under dilution laws concern lawful, non-misleading activities, and
thus are protected by the First Amendment. Moving to the second part, dilution
can be a permissible regulation of commercial speech only if the asserted
governmental interest underlying dilution laws is substantial. As discussed
below, dilution laws fail to meet this standard, because the supposed harms that
dilution laws prevent or remedy are either nonexistent, insubstantial, or relevant
only to the ability of businesses to derive profits from consumers without
bestowing any commensurate public benefits such as lower prices, better
products, greater product choices, or better information to assist consumers in
making their choices.4 ° Because dilution laws offer no substantial public benefits
to compensate for their suppression of speech, they cannot survive scrutiny
under the second part of the CentralHudson test.
B.

The Asserted Injury

Traditionally, the First Amendment has not barred prior restraints on
commercial speech which is fraudulent in nature. However, dilution laws do not
protect consumers against fraud or confusion. Commercial speech that is alleged
to dilute a trademark is merely speech that the trademark owner believes will
injure its own commercial interests. Because dilution does not involve
fraudulent or misleading speech, if First Amendment protection is to be withheld
from dilutive speech, then it must be on the basis of some justification other than
protecting consumers against fraud or confusion. Such justification is difficult to
identify in the case of dilution laws.
To sustain a restriction on commercial speech, the state "must demonstrate
that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them
to a material degree."'" The standard of proof "requires more than 'mere
speculation or conjecture."' 42 Yet, the proponents of dilution laws have yet to
establish that those laws protect the public from harm of any sort. If any harm
can be traced to dilutive speech, it is harm to the ability of merchants to profit

38. Fox, 492 U.S. at 480.
39. Id.
40. As Justice Stevens noted in 44 Liquormart,Inc. v. Rhode Island, "It is the State's interest in
protecting consumers from 'commercial harms' that provides 'the typical reason why commercial
speech can be subject to greater governmental regulation than noncommercial speech.'" 517 U.S. 484,
502 (1996) (Stevens, J., plurality) (quoting City ofCincinnati v. Discovery Network. Inc., 507 U.S. 410.
426 (1993)).
41. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 71 (1993).
42. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 532 n. 18 (2001) (quoting Greater New Orleans Broad.
Ass'n., v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999)).
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from psychological manipulation of consumers. Because this psychological
manipulation offers no public benefits, preserving the power of merchants to
manipulate consumers is not the type of harm that justifies suppression of
commercial speech.
If anything, dilution laws may actually cause, rather than prevent, harm to
the public. If psychological manipulation leads consumers to make purchasing
decisions that are not in their best interest, then a dilution law that strengthens
the ability of merchants to engage in this manipulation, unimpeded by their
competitors, will benefit merchants at the expense of consumers. Indeed, the
ability of dilution laws to enhance advertisers' ability to manipulate consumer
preferences has led Professor Christine Haight Farley to describe dilution laws
as "statutorily enforced mind control. 43
1.

The Asserted Harm from Dilutive Activities Is Too Speculative to
Support a Restriction on CommercialSpeech

What harm does dilution actually cause? The problem of defining this harm
is well-documented, and it has been persuasively argued that the alleged harm is
simply non-existent." As Professor Farley has suggested,45 this would explain
why trademark owners lobbied Congress to require federal dilution plaintiffs to
establish only a "likelihood" of dilution rather than actual dilution, after the
Supreme Court in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.46 interpreted the thencurrent federal dilution statute to require proof of actual injury.4 The resulting
amendment brought the federal statute into line with most state dilution statutes,
which require only a likelihood of dilution.
The resort to likelihood of dilution is not surprising, because it virtually
eliminates the need for trademark owners to demonstrate more than the renown
of their own mark and the similarity of the defendant's mark. This is a far easier
evidentiary hurdle to overcome than the likelihood of confusion standard in
traditional trademark law, where the defendant must at least convince the
factfinder that the similarity of the marks is likely to confuse a substantial
number of ordinarily prudent consumers. Indeed, whenever dilution plaintiffs
have tried to demonstrate actual harm from dilutive activities, they have failed.4"
While the case law, legislative histories, and scholarly literature are replete with

43. Christine Haight Farley, Why We Are Confused About the Trademark Dilution Law, 16
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1175, 1183 (2006).
44. See, e.g.. id. at 1183-84 (asking ifdilution truly exists).
45. Jd. at 1181 84.
46. 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
47. Id. at 432-33.
48. See, e.g., Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue. Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 432-34 (2003) (failing to show
harm to Victoria's Secret from small retailer Victor's Little Secret); Ringling Bros.-Bamrnum & Bailey
Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 463 (4th Cir. 1999) (failing to show
harm to circus from state tourism slogan "Greatest Snow on Earth").
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hypotheticals ("DUPONT shoes, BUICK aspirin, KODAK pianos"),4 9 they offer
no instances in which a famous trademark has demonstrably suffered harm of
either type. The Fourth Circuit lamented in Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey:
[T]he most significant feature of the state antidilution statutes
has been their requirement that only a "likelihood of dilution"
rather than actual dilution need be proved to entitle a claimant
to the injunctive relief which they provide as the sole statutory
remedy. This has enabled the courts to avoid hard definition of
the economic harm to a senior mark's "selling power" that they
generally agree is an essential element of statutory "dilution."
And, even more critically, the necessary speculativeness of any
inquiry into future states and conditions has led some courts to
allow the essential elements of "likely" dilution to be inferred
...or, even more drastically, to be presumed from no more
than the identity or sufficient similarity of the two marks. °
Courts have searched in vain for an appropriate test to assess likelihood of
dilution. In blurring cases, some courts have resorted to a multi-factor test which
seems more relevant to assessing the likelihood of confusion than the likelihood
of dilution, 51 an approach that has deservedly been criticized, but which has now
been adopted in the latest amendments to the federal dilution statute.52
In effect, dilution is the "vaporware" of trademark law. The harms which
dilution laws are designed to prevent, or remedy, or both, cannot be clearly
defined and have not been proven to exist. Dilution laws are based on "mere
speculation and conjecture," and therefore fail to advance a substantial
government interest as required by CentralHudson.
2. Even if the Harm from Dilutive Commercial Speech Is Real,
Dilution Laws Are Not Supported by a Substantial Governmental
Interest
Alternatively, let us suppose that the speculation about dilution harming the
value of trademarks is true. Many scholars characterize dilution by blurring as a

49. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3, reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030.
50. Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 458.
51. This test, suggested by Judge Sweet's concurring opinion in Mead Data Central, Inc. v.
Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., considers the "1) similarity of the marks 2) similarity of the products
covered by the marks 3) sophistication of consumers 4) predatory intent 5) renown of the senior mark
[and] 6) renown of the junior mark." 875 F.2d 1026, 1035 (2d Cir. 1989) (applying the New York
dilution statute).
52. See, e.g., I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co.. 163 F.3d 27. 49-50 (1st Cir. 1998) (rejecting
intent and sophistication as factors in dilution analysis); see also Trademark Dilution Revision Act of
2006 § 2, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730, 1731 (to be codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
1125(c)(2)(B)) (adopting the multi-factor test for dilution by blurring).
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form of free-riding-that is, allowing one merchant to benefit from the favorable
connotations of another merchant's trademark.53 In contrast, tarnishment laws
protect the investment of a merchant in creating favorable associations for a
mark; unauthorized uses of the mark may undermine those favorable
associations in the mind of consumers. But even if these harms are real, do they
justify governmental suppression of commercial speech? This Essay suggests
that they do not, because any harm to the value of the trademarks affected by
dilutive speech interferes only with the ability of the trademark owners to
psychologically manipulate consumers. Preserving the ability of trademark
owners to influence consumers in this way does not amount to a substantial
governmental interest.
It is a familiar argument that trademarks promote irrational consumer
preferences. 4 In their origin-identifying capacity, of course, trademarks can
convey useful information to consumers, allowing consumers to predict the
characteristics of goods and services before purchasing them, and enhancing the
accountability of merchants when those goods and services fail to meet
expectations. To the extent that trademarks serve as origin indicators, the
government has a legitimate and substantial interest in protecting consumers
from being misled about the origin of goods through trademark infringement.
But owners can also use trademarks to create illusions and favorable
associations that lead consumers to make purchasing decisions based on
psychological vulnerability.
Literature on marketing psychology brims with references to the emotional
and psychological power of brand names. Consumers, we are told, will eagerly
attach themselves to brands that help them to establish and maintain a favorable
self-concept.5" Consumption becomes a continuing-and perhaps
insatiable-quest for self-esteem, and the favorable connotations surrounding a
brand make consumers want to associate themselves with that brand. HarleyDavidson, for example, illustrates the power of a trademark to appeal to a
consumer's emotions and desire to achieve a favorable self-image: "A big part
of Harley-Davidson's appeal lies in the personality of the bike itself. It
encapsulates masculinity, defiance, and rugged individualism."56 It is not

53. Farley, supra note 43, at 1185; Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in 60 Milliseconds: Trademark Law
& Cognitive Science. 86 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007); see also Ty Inc. v.Perryman, 306 F.3d 509,
512 (7th Cir. 2002).
54. See, e.g., J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 2:38 (2006) (noting that "trademarks are criticized as creating 'irrational' consumer preferences").
55. See, e.g.. Jennifer Edson Escalas & James R. Bettman, Self-Construal,Reference Groups, and
Brand Meaning, 32 J. CONSUMER RES. 378. 378 (2005) ("[P]eople do not buy products just for what
they do, but also for what the product means; thus, brands can be symbols whose meaning is used to
create and define a consumer's self-concept." (citing Sidney J. Levy, Symbolsfor Sale, HARV. Bus.
REV., July Aug. 1959, at 117 24)).
56. Gita Venkataramani Johar, Jaideep Sengupta & Jennifer L. Aaker, Two Roads to Updating
Brand PersonalityImpressions: Trait Versus Evaluative Inferencing,42 J. MARKETING RES. 458, 458
(2005) (citing Susan Foumier, Building BrandCommunity on the Harley-DavidsonPosse Ride, Harvard
Business School Note No. 5-501-052, at 1-20 (2001)).
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surprising, then, when a trademark owner objects even to non-confusing uses of
the mark if those uses might tarnish or free-ride on the carefully crafted
psychological associations of that mark.
In fact, Professor Tamara Piety has suggested that the ability of advertising
to prey on the vulnerabilities of consumers is an argument against any First
Amendment protection for commercial advertising. s
The psychology of
advertising, she argues, is analogous to the process of addiction in that it leads
consumers on a never-ending quest to achieve unrealistic goals through
increased consumption.58
Although Professor Piety suggests that the irrational effects of advertising
should completely strip it of First Amendment protection, in the context of
dilution laws these same observations can support an argument for greaterFirst
Amendment protection for advertising and other commercial speech, so that
trademark owners will not be able to use dilution laws to enhance their influence
over consumer attitudes by suppressing all unauthorized commercial uses of
their trademarks. This Essay does not, and need not, argue that there is anything
inherently wrong with merchants attempting to sell illusions or to create
irrational consumer preferences. However, it does suggest that state and federal
governments have no legitimate interest in intervening in the marketplace in
order to foster these efforts. Thus, consumers are free to be irrational, and
merchants are free to profit from those choices, but the government has no
business suppressing commercial speech simply to protect these profits.
Some researchers suggest that the harm from blurring consists of increased
"internal search costs" for consumers.5 9 When consumers encounter a new use of
a familiar mark, they may no longer be as quick to associate the famous mark
with the goods or services which they previously associated with that brand,
even when they are not confused about the origin of the junior user's goods.
Empirical tests purport to quantify this slower processing time.60 For example, a
consumer that encountered Dogiva dog biscuits was, when tested shortly
thereafter, somewhat slower to associate Godiva with chocolates. 6 The
difference was a matter of milliseconds at most, and no studies have indicated
how long this effect might persist.62
One can understand why the slower processing time might trouble the owner
of the Godiva mark. But are consumers really harmed by having to think for

57. Tamara R. Piety, "Merchants of Discontent": An Exploration of the Psychology of
Advertising, Addiction, and the Implicationsfor Commercial Speech, 25 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 377,
435 38, 449 50 (2001). As Professor Piety notes, however, other scholars have disagreed. Id. at 436
(citing Sylvia A. Law, Addiction, Autonomy, andAdvertising,77 1OWA L. REv. 909. 930-33 (1992)).
58. Id. at 387. 432-33.
59. For a detailed examination and critique of the authorities discussed in this subpart, see
Tushnet, supra note 53. See also infra notes 60 61 and accompanying text.
60. Tushnet, supra note 53. at 12-14 (citing Maureen Morrin & Jacob Jacoby. Trademark
Dilution: EmpiricalMeasuresforan Elusive Concept, 19 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 265, 269-70
(2000)).
61. Morrin & Jacoby, supra note 60, at 269.
62. See Tushnet, supra note 53, at 18.
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some extra milliseconds? Isn't it enough that I recognize Godiva as a trademark
when it appears on a box of chocolates? Godiva, of course, would prefer that
the mere mention of the word Godiva made me think of-and want-a box of
their premium-priced confections. As a consumer, am I harmed by the
knowledge that a variation on the Godiva name also identifies a maker of dog
biscuits? If so, then surely I suffer harm as well from the longstanding coexistence fo Delta Faucets and Delta Airlines. Are San Franciscans harmed by
the extra milliseconds required to distinguish Sears Fine Food from Sears
department stores?
Who really suffers when consumers have to think a little bit more before
associating a brand with its products? Once a trademark owner establishes a
powerful image for its brand, the trademark owner benefits if consumers think as
little as possible about their purchasing decisions. The more the consumer
thinks, the less likely he or she is to react uncritically to the emotional or
psychological appeal of the trademark, and the more likely he or she is to
examine the characteristics, cost, and quality of the goods that bear the mark,
and to think about what benefits will in fact be derived from purchasing the
goods. Thus, the "internal search costs" argument demonstrates, at most, that
preventing dilution by blurring will help merchants to obtain unfettered access to
the consumer's mind. The "costs" of dilution by blurring, even if real, are not
costs experienced by the consumer at all, but costs experienced by the merchant
who prefers to encounter no resistance in accessing the consumer's mind.
In contrast, tarnishment laws are not about prevention of free-riding or
slowed mental associations. Rather, they are aimed at preventing disparagement
of a trademark, even when that disparagement does not involve false or
misleading statements. Tarnishment is like trade libel without the falsehood;
instead of disparaging the product or service in a way that can be proven true or
false, tarnishment is a less direct swipe, one which merely tries to alter public
opinion rather than disseminate false information.
Tarnishment is therefore a form of criticism. As such, it merits a high degree
of protection under the First Amendment. Instead, dilution laws suppress this
form of criticism.
This result is the opposite of that which obtains under the "fair use"
standards of copyright law. Copyright's fair use exception exists in large part to
prevent copyright law from running afoul of the First Amendment, and in
service of this goal it provides a high degree of protection to copying which
takes place in the context of criticism or commentary. In determining whether a
particular instance of copying constitutes infringement or fair use, the Supreme
Court has recognized that copyright owners should generally not be permitted to
suppress parody or other forms of critical commentary that are designed to
change the public's opinion of their copyrighted works. All other things being
equal, the fair use doctrine in copyright law provides greater protection against
copyright infringement claims to speech that disparages a plaintiff's expressive
work than to speech which makes no commentary at all about the work.
Although fair use does not completely immunize all criticism and
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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commentary from infringement claims, the Court has made clear that, in
determining whether a copyright owner has suffered actionable harm from the
unauthorized copying of a work, no weight should be given to harm that arises
solely from the critic's success in changing the public's opinion of the work.
Consider the Supreme Court's analysis of parody as fair use in Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.6 3 In determining whether, under the fourth fair use factor,
the defendant's use of the plaintiff s work would injure the market for that work,
the Court made clear that it would disregard any injury that resulted from the
parody's success at ridiculing the copyrighted work:
[W]hen a lethal parody, like a scathing theater review, kills
demand for the original, it does not produce a harm cognizable
under the Copyright Act. Because "parody may quite
legitimately aim at garroting the original, destroying it
commercially as well as artistically," the role of the courts is to
distinguish between "[b]iting criticism [that merely] suppresses
64
demand [and] copyright infringement[, which] usurps it."
Thus, damaging the reputation of a copyrighted work through parody is not
tortious; rather, it is a legitimate attempt to influence public opinion of the work.
No falsehoods are involved only an expression of opinion.
Imitation of a famous mark in order to criticize, parody, or otherwise
comment on the mark has the same type of effect on the mark's reputation
regardless of whether the imitation takes place in commercial speech or in
noncommercial expression. Thus, for example, a Saturday Night Live sketch in
which characters express disdain for Godiva chocolates could be at least as
tarnishing as allowing a merchant to sell Dogiva dog biscuits-indeed, it could
easily do much greater damage to the Godiva mark. The First Amendment
would provide strong protection for the Saturday Night Live sketch as
expressive speech even though it might damage the favorable associations of the
Godiva brand. When a similar result follows from the offering of Dogiva dog
biscuits, this, too, results from commentary or criticism that is deserving of First
Amendment protection. The government simply has no substantial interest in
silencing this speech, provided that consumers are not being confused or misled.
Il1.

CONCLUSION AND PROPOSED MORATORIUM

I have argued that the harms from dilution are speculative, and that even if
they are real they do not warrant government suppression of commercial speech.
I could be wrong. But under current law, how will we ever know? As others
have pointed out, requiring trademark owners to prove only the likelihood of

63. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
64. Id. at 591 92 (citations omitted) (quoting BENJAMIN KAPLAN,
COPYRIGHT 69 (1967); Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1986)).
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dilution, as opposed to actual dilution, means that courts will continue to enjoin
alleged dilution without ever giving us a chance to find out if there really is such
thing as a dilution injury.
What we need is a moratorium on injunctive relief for dilution claims. For
the near future, courts should hold that the asserted injury from dilution is
simply too speculative or insufficiently related to the public interest, or both, to
satisfy the substantial interest test for government restrictions on commercial
speech under CentralHudson.
While the moratorium is in place, dilution plaintiffs will still be entitled to
recover damages where the relevant statute permits, 6 but in order to do so they
will have to demonstrate actual injury. If a plaintiff succeeds in proving injury,
the court will then determine whether it is the type of injury that warrants
government intervention. If the injury affects only the merchant's ability to
inflate demand for its goods by manipulating consumers, this may not constitute
a substantial interest that justifies government interference with commercial
speech. If the plaintiff can demonstrate that the injury directly harms consumers
or interferes with the efficient functioning of the competitive marketplace in a
manner that indirectly harms consumers, government intervention may be
warranted, provided that the intervention satisfies the remainder of the Central
Hudson test i.e., that the restriction directly advances the governmental interest
in preventing these harms and is no more extensive than necessary to accomplish
this result.
Only after this moratorium has been in place for a time will it be possible to
draw conclusions as to whether allegedly dilutive activities in fact cause harm of
a type that warrants government intervention. If they do, then the harm from
dilution will no longer be speculative, and courts may then return to issuing
injunctive relief as an appropriate remedy. The moratorium period may even
yield interesting results that will help courts to determine when injunctive relief
is appropriate and when it is not. For example, the nature of the injury arising
from dilution by blurring may be sufficiently different from the injury arising
from dilution by tarnishment claims that one type of claim may warrant
injunctive relief but not the other. Alternatively, the moratorium period may
provide information that will lead to a specific set of standards for determining
when injunctive relief is appropriate in dilution cases.
Maybe dilution laws do have a reason to live. But how will we know if we
do not put them to the test?

65. Because state dilution statutes typically create a cause of action based on likelihood of dilution
rather than actual dilution, they usually provide only injunctive relief See, e.g.. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW
360-1 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 2007). The federal statute permits an award of damages only if the
defendant "willfully intended" to blur or tarnish the plaintiff's mark. Trademark Dilution Act of 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-312. § 2, 120 Stat. 1730, 1732 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(5)(B)). However,
if courts begin to withhold injunctive relief on First Amendment grounds, state legislatures will be free
to amend their dilution statutes to permit damages awards where plaintiffs are able to prove injury. The
constitutionality of these damages provisions, like the damages provisions in the federal statute, can
then be assessed under Central Hudson.
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